

五四運動與美國對於中國宣傳活動再論

The Media Wars: Launching the May Fourth Movement
World War I and the American Propaganda Activities in
China, Led by P. S. Reinsch and Carl Crow

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Introduction

The May Fourth Movement is generally recognized as the cradle of modernized democratic or political movement in China.¹ Once it exploded at Peking on May 4 in

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¹ The appraisals of May Fourth Movement had been temporarily changed according to political situation. We can survey the course of the changes in China and Japan through 《五四運動史像の再検討》 (Chuo University Press 1986), especially by two articles of Michihiko Saitou 齋藤道彦 and Kasahara

1919, the movement involved various classes and spread to the whole country. Actually two important political parties were established after this movement, namely were the China Nationalist Party and China Communist Party. In the studies of the May Fourth Movement, Literary Revolution is supposed to indicate the intellectual awakening and mark the prologue to the movement. In addition, some studies had emphasized the influence of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Of course the influences of the Russian Revolution might have attracted the attention of many students. It is true that Revolutionary Russian government issued the principles for ending the WWI, including the famous phrase "self-determination." But the Russian couldn't attend the conference. Of course we can not deny the influence of the Russian Revolution of 1917 totally. Because Wilson's Fourteen Points themselves were also influenced by the disclosure diplomacy of the revolutionary Russia. But, so far, American influence has been neglected, or underestimated. It is Wilson's Fourteen Points which were adapted as the principle of the conference. I would like to examine the influence of the American propaganda activities on this movement. At that period, soon after the United States entered World War I until the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Conference, the American government possessed a powerful propaganda organization, namely the Committee on Public Information. It circulated American propaganda eagerly not only domestically but also internationally.

In China, two people Carl Crow and P. S. Reinsch circulated American propaganda eagerly. Carl Crow was the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information, and P. S. Reinsch was an American Minister to Peking, The

Tokuji 笠原十九司. And there is another group studies, *Studies on the May Fourth Movement* 《京都大學人文科學研究所共同研究報告・五四運動の研究》 volume 1-5. 1982-92, Kyoto Dohousha corporation.

May Fourth Movement is believed to have happened because of the advocacy of Wilson's Fourteen Points and the disappointment of his compromise with Japan. Then, how were media conditions at the time? How were Wilson's Fourteen Points and other statements communicated to China and circulated? How about his compromise with Japan over the Shantung Problem? If we consider the affection of the Peace Conference on China, we should not deny the method by which the news was carried at that time. The Fourteen Points were communicated to China through massive American propaganda activities. Then how were the conditions of media in China? How did American or European news come from? What media was available in China?

It was a formidable job for Wilson, who declared war against Germany on April 16, to unify the domestic public opinion. And he succeeded with the establishment and activities of the Committee on Public Information.² Just after America entered the war, the committee began to act vigorously, it "was a gargantuan advertising agency the like of which the country had never known."³

And, in China, American Minister to Peking P. S. Reinsch (1913-19)⁴ and Carl Crow of the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information had acted eagerly⁵. They both mentioned their relations to the May Fourth Movement, but so far their activities have been neglected.

Their propaganda activities were essential to realize the mechanism which

² Mock, James R., and Cedric Larson. *Words that Won the War; the Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919*. Princeton University Press 1939.

³ WWW. p. 5.

⁴ Paul S. Reinsch (1869-1922) was appointed America Minister to Peking by Wilson in 1913. He resigned in 1919.

⁵ Carl Crow (1883-1945) once went to China just before the revolution of 1911. And again returned to China as the Far Eastern representative of the "Compub" and, after war, became a resident in the international settlement of Shanghai until 1937. *CURRENT BIOGRAPHY; WHO'S NEWS AND WHY, 1941*.

launched the May Fourth Movement. But, I don't believe that American propaganda was the only reason for the movement. The May Fourth Movement began with the students' movement at Peking, and spread to various classes and to the whole country. It is probable to guess there existed many factors which made it possible for such a massive movement to emerge. I only want to examine just one clue, the communication background which launched the May Fourth Movement. Furthermore, I want to testify to the excellency of a contemporary China watcher Carl Crow, who fixed the May Fourth Movement actually.

Chapter One: the Committee on Public Information Acted at Far East

So let's look at a clue to the problem of the American influence on the May Fourth Movement. What had launched the May Fourth Movement, and how? Carl Crow was in charge of American propaganda activities in China, as the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information. He described the conditions of China, just before the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement.

The next development came while the Versailles Peace Conference was still in session. China had entered the war on the side of the Allies and, although her contribution toward the defeat to the central powers was very small, Dr. Sun and other Chinese leaders had high hopes. They had made very liberal interpretations of President Wilson's fine words and especially of his electrifying phrase "self-determination." Every thinking Chinese knew that if the Chinese were allowed to determine their own destiny they would regain their own sovereignty. This would mean the abolition of the unequal treaties and the surrender of the many settlements, concessions and special administrative areas which were governed either wholly or in part by foreign powers.

.....It fell to my lot to play a small part in encouraging the Chinese to believe that the principles so clearly and confidently announced by President Wilson would be

implemented to liberate them from the unequal treaties. Shortly after we entered the war, I was appointed the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information, the predecessor of the present Office of War Information. I worked directly under the orders of Dr. Paul F. Reinsch the American Minister to China.....My work was very simple and easy for President Wilson's speeches and statements provided ideal propaganda material. We gave them the widest possible publicity. They were cabled to my Shanghai office in full and we recabled them to all important points in the Far East. After the president had presented his famous Fourteen Points, Dr. Reinsch said he thought it would be a good idea to collect all the war speeches, have them translated into Chinese and published in book form. I had the translation work done by a famous Chinese scholar and then arranged with the Commercial Press, the leading publishers of China, to bring out the book. From the day of its publication it was a sensational best seller and ran into many editions.⁶

Crow also stated the situation in another book the same as in the above lines.⁷ We can guess that the circulation of Wilson's Fourteen Points in China had contributed much to the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement. It was, probably, due to activities of the Committee on Public Information. But we must tell of the testimony of Crow from other sources. We can prove Crow's descriptions through diplomatic documents both of Japan and America. Minister Reinsch reported to the Secretary of the States quarterly in every year, examining the economic, political and other problems in China. He reported, in the last quarter of 1918, that:

During the past three months the work in China of the Committee on Public Information under the able direction of Mr. Carl Crow has much to increase American prestige and popularity. Two main lines of work have been adopted. An elaborate list of local officials and persons of importance has been compiled with the assistance of American residents

⁶ CTHP, pp. 112-4.

⁷ I SPEAK FOR THE CHINESE, Harper & Brother, 1937, p. 27.

throughout the country to, whom literature in Chinese is sent. In this way President Wilson's speeches for example have been given the widest publicity with most gratifying results. There is no doubt that Mr. Wilson is now the most widely known foreign statesman in China.⁸

Thus Reinsch had praised the activities of Carl Crow, the far eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information as "able direction." We also know of concrete activities; compiling an elaborate list of important people and sending them literature in Chinese.

Then, what is the Committee on Public Information, whose Far Eastern Representative was Carl Crow? What was the origin? How did it come to exist?

In 1916, Wilson was elected as President again, but through the campaign he had emphasized that he had "Kept" the United States "Out of War."⁹ In February of 1917, the German government declared Unlimited Submarine Warfare. The United States almost moved to enter the war, but there also existed an awkward anti-war atmosphere. Because the European fronts were so far away, and modernized warfare exhausted so much of the budgets, machines and, of course, the sacrifices of human lives. So the public opinion of the United States had not been rigidly unified even at the time of the declaration of war on April 6 1917.¹⁰ For Wilson, it was inevitably necessary to unify domestic public opinion and appeal immediately the United States' cause to the rest of the world.

The Committee on Public Information was organized on April 13, just one week after the declaration of war by the United States, on April 6th.¹¹ The origin of the

8 *The Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (PRFR.), 1919, p. 283.

9 Wilson's slogan in the campaign was "He Kept Us Out of War". WWW, p. 3.

10 WWW, p. 4.

11 WWW, p. 50.

committee was a letter sent by three Secretaries. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy sent a letter to the President, and argued that it was necessary to own "some authoritative agency to assure the publication of all the vital facts of national defense."¹² The committee was organized based upon this letter.¹³ Of course, the word "assure" contains the meaning of "censorship."¹⁴ The committee consisted of these three Secretaries and a journalist, George Creel. Creel was appointed as civilian chairman. He assembled the Committee as such a "Brilliant and talented a group of journalists, scholars, press agents, editors, artists, and other manipulators of the symbols of public opinion as America had ever seen united for a single purpose."¹⁵ He virtually managed the committee. So, this committee was also called Creel Committee.¹⁶ The Committee on Public Information used all media available (prints, cartoons, posters, movies, 'four minutes man') to persuade American opinion to join and fight the war against Germany. The activities of the Committee on Public Information in foreign countries aimed to promote American causes, make neutral powers closer to America and do intentional misinformation operations on the enemy countries.¹⁷ Foreign activities were mainly operated in Europe and Latin America.¹⁸ Of course, there were propaganda activities in China.

12 WWW, p. 50-1.

13 WWW, p. 51. The order was issued at 14th of April, but dated 13th of April.

14 We can survey the censorship of the World War I period in the United States through WWW, pp. 19-47. and James R. Mock, *Censorship 1917*. Princeton University Press, 1941.

15 WWW, pp. 48-74.

16 George Creel (1876-1953), was a journalist who supported W. Wilson during his President election campaign and appointed civilian chief of the Committee on Public Information

17 WWW, -ix-. The Committee on Public Information aimed to (1) forebear morale of the national (2) keep friendship with allied powers (3) keep friendship with neutral powers and if possible to cooperate, (4) discourage enemies.

18 WWW, pp. 235-334.

Chapter Two: Propaganda Activities in China

What then, were the conditions of media in China at that time? The extent of the possession of communication methods of other Powers, proportionally, were due to the degree of their invasion of China. Also, the communication methods were decisive weapons in media wars. Thus World War I had an aspect of media war.

Britain and France owned their own syndicate organization.¹⁹ Even Germany had owned submarine cable which could transfer news to China.²⁰ Reinsch reported the activities of East Asiatic Lloyd of Germany and of a Japanese syndicate.²¹ The United States was the only one of the major powers that did not own communication methods, like submarine cables. Of course, in the big cities of China, American syndicate correspondents stayed, such as the Associated Press.²² The United States could use submarine cables, but with high costs.

It is said that the British was using Reuters news effectively, not only in transmission of news but also in propaganda circulation.²³ However, Reuters conveyed a limited news concerning America. Reinsch reported:

The only agency supplying news in China is Reuter's. Its news budget is made up in

19 WWW. p. 240.

Until the war the United States was almost alone among the great powers in having no means either of spreading propaganda or of controlling news channels. England through Reuters and France through Agence Havas had been able to carry their story far and wide, and, besides the news service, England had developed a worldwide propaganda which excites admiration to this day.

20 WWW. p. 240.

The notorious pre 1917 propaganda machine of Germany had been seriously handicapped but by no means destroyed by Allied seizure and cutting of cables, and the powerful wireless station at Nauener was in constant communication with German agents in distant countries.

21 PRFR. 1919, p. 283.

22 CTHP. p. 9.

23 WWW. p. 240.

London. It proceeds to Spain, Morocco, and down the west coast of Africa to the Cape; thence up the east coast of Egypt, Persia, India, and Ceylon. At each of the main stations on the way items of only local interest there are with drawn. What is left at Ceylon as of interest to the Far East is sent on to Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as by another route to Australia. It is quite natural that with such a source and such a routing, this service should carry next to nothing about America. I once had it observed for a whole month in June, 1916, when the only American item carried was that Mr. Bryan had shed tears at the National Democratic Convention!²⁴

Reuters had been regarded in China as an almost native communication syndicate.²⁵ But Reuters news included almost nothing about American news. So "the Compub" had to find out the methods by which it could communicate American news. How did it become possible to circulate Wilson's statements and "world news from an impartial American viewpoint"²⁶ and the news of the Peace Conference?

The United States, or the committee, could not use submarine cable freely.²⁷

Propaganda activities in China owed much to the wireless system of the American navy. American Navy operators at San Francisco sent words to the Pearl Harbor station at Hawaii, and from there it went to the Orient. The message was intercepted at Guam, and there put on the cable for Crow in China. We can clarify the routes of the transmission, by way of the United States, of the news.²⁸

24 AADC. pp. 159-60, WWW. p. 240.

25 WWW. p. 240.

26 WWW. p. 240. AADC. pp. 159-160. Freshness and correctness were so essential.

27 Ozeki's article p. 66.

28 WWW. pp. 240-1.

The United States, too, wanted its story to be told abroad,.....Help came from the Navy Department which, at President Wilson's order, had seized all wireless establishments upon the outbreak of war. Arrangement was made for a daily news dispatch from the United States.....The wireless system was never thoroughly satisfactory, and the CPI Foreign Section would have been unable to do its job without the cables.

On the other hand, a Japanese diplomat reported the vigorous propaganda of the United States. Japanese consul general to Shanghai Ariyoshi reported the activities of Carl Crow. In his report of November 30, he reported that:

.....Carl Crow supplied dispatches freely to newspapers at Shanghai through the information bureau of Millard's Review of the Far East.²⁹

Ariyoshi added that the Information Bureau was founded by the American consul general. So, diplomatic documents of both sides, Japan and the United States, coincidentally have proved Crow's propaganda activities, pointing out his name. Moreover, the report of the Japanese General Consul dated November of 1918, and Reinsch's report was an analysis of the various conditions in China during the last quarter of 1918.

Chapter Three: Media Wars between Japan and America Still Continued

In January of 1919, just before the Peace Conference, Reinsch assure the effectiveness of direct or wireless news with his staff, including Crow.³⁰

The publication in Peking of news from abroad was much facilitated by wireless.....The importance of a direct news service was demonstrated during the war, when under an arrangement by the Committee on Public information a budget of news was sent by wireless daily to the Far East. For the first time in history had there been anything approaching a fairly complete statement of what was going on in the United states. The

29 Japan Diplomacy Documents 1918. "Issue 16: Preparation for the Peace Conference" No. 521

尚米國側ニ於テハ最近「インフォメーション・ビューロー」ヲ「ミラード・レビュー」社内ニ設ケ「チャイナ・アンド・ジャパン」ノ著者（日本及日英同盟ヲ攻撃シタルノニシテ英國ニ於テ販賣禁止ヤラレタルモノ）Carl Crowヲ主任トシ無料ニテ各新聞社ニ通信ノ配布ヲナシ居リ右ハ總領事館ノ經營ニ係ルモノナリトノコトナリ。

30 AADC, p. 158.

service of news of the Peace Conference was also particularly appreciated by everybody in China. China had never been so close to Europe before.³¹

In spite of the end of war, Reinsch was ready for the Paris Conference making sure of the effectiveness of the wireless system of the American Navy. The defeat of Germany never ended the media wars against Japan.

In the battlefield of communication wars, the real enemy to America, or China, was Japan.

Although the Japanese were fighting with us in the war against Germany, they hampered my work--as they did the work of other American officials--in every possible way. Their interference was petty but very irritating. Through the American navy wireless I received each day in Shanghai a summary of the day's war news, and this we translated and supplied to the Chinese newspapers. The Japanese military authorities picked up these messages at Tsinanfu and sent out garbled versions in which American victories were either ignored or minimized. It was an essential part of Japanese propaganda to convince the Chinese that the Japanese army was superior to all others, and that American military strength was particularly ineffective.³²

It is hard to believe this kind of intentional misinformation operation existed. However at that time, it was common case to spread wrong news intentionally.³³ Crow feared that Japan's control of China would become absolutely rigid. He stated:

.....a very large part of the work of American officials at our legation consisted in checking up on the activities of the Japanese in China and attempting to circumvent their plots. Other Allied powers were engaged in similar work. This was the war as fought on the Chinese front. Victory over Germany was a matter of supreme importance, but, in the meantime, there was imminent danger that China with its rich potential markets would

31 AADC, pp. 158-9.

32 ISC, p. 16.

33 For example, even after the defeat, the German circulated in China that Germany had not been defeated. PRFR, 1919, p. 283.

fall into the hands of Japan, that the allied gains in Europe would only be offset by losses in the Orient.³⁴

How were the counter attacks of America? J. B. Powell wrote that "another demand of the fifth group of the infamous Twenty One Demand" was made by Japan. He and Hollington K. Tong disclosed the demand, with cooperating with Carl Crow of "Compub." Before the disclosure, both of them asked Reinsch for counsel about the demands. Reinsch had once made a vigorous protest against the Japanese government at the Twenty-one Demands of 1915. Based upon his own experience, Reinsch advised them that the best way to stop Japan was to disclose.³⁵

Of course this kind of anti-Japan propaganda naturally provoked Japanese attention. When the Peace Conference was in preparation, Japanese consul general to Shanghai Ariyoshi reported that:

We cannot ignore the massive circulation of anti-Japanese news, which have been spread by the China Press and Millard's Review of the Far East, both founded by American fund. It is doubtful that they don't have any systematic relations between them.³⁶

This analysis was based on the opinion of the English newspapers and magazines in Shanghai. In fact there were strong bonds among the staff of delegation to the conference, from the two governments of Peking and Canton.³⁷ Reinsch had been the most trustworthy adviser to the Peking government, and Crow had been acted under the direct order of Reinsch. Wu Ting-fang and Tang Shao-yi were staff of the Canton government, and they had been friends of Crow since the revolution of

34 ISC. pp. 15-6.

35 MTC. pp. 43-5.

36 Japan Diplomacy Documents. 1918. "Preparation for the Peace Conference" No. 521.

「チャイナ・プレス」「ミラド・レビュー」等アメリカ系新聞雑誌が盛んに排日ノ記事ヲ掲ゲルハ注意ニ値シ、右ハ若干組織系統アル運動ニアラズヤト推察ヤラルル節アリ。

37 陳三井，〈陸徵祥與巴黎和會〉，《中國近代現代史論集·民初外交（上）》。

1911.³⁸ Tang Shao-yi also had close relationships with "young china" Wellington Koo (顧維鈞) and Wang Cheng-t'ing (王正廷).³⁹

The Chinese delegation to the Conference included T. F. F. Millard as an adviser for propaganda. In a sense, he is the enigma that decodes the relationships among the people of the two Chinese governments, American diplomats and American journalists. China Press and Millard's Review of the Far East were founded by Millard. Millard had founded China Press in 1911 with Wu Ting-fang, and later founded Millard's Review of the Far East. Crow and Powell were invited to help him with the publication of these two media. Also T. F. F. Millard, Carl Crow, J. B. Powell and Hollington K. Tong were all graduates from the school of Journalism of Missouri University. If we consider these relationships among them, we can guess there existed more systematic activities than Ariyoshi expected.⁴⁰

By the way, "Young China" of Wellington Koo and Wang Cheng-t'ing advocated the return of Shantung with all interests, and had succeeded in capturing the praise and the sympathy of the delegations of Powers except Japan.⁴¹ Meanwhile,

38 CTHP. pp. 15-21.

39 Wang Chen-t'ing was the Vice-minister of Industrial-commercial Ministry under Premier Tang Shao-yi at 1912. At the same time, Wellington Koo was a secretary at the Cabinet, and later Koo became a son in law of Tang Shao-yi.

Japan Diplomacy Documents. 1919, "issue No. 3: China problem especailly Shantung problem. "「事項三 巴里講和會ニ於ケル中國問題特ニ山東問題ニ關スル件」("the Shantung Problem.") No. 106. No. 134.

40 The Shantung Problem. No. 84. Anti-Japanese movements were not only available in China. They also available in The United States. The organization was China Agency. It was said this organization was funded by the Canton government. "the Shantung Problem." No. 86, 86, 99, 120, 134, 148.

41 January 28, Wellington Koo made a speech at eleventh former meeting and requested the return of Shantung. His impressive speech moved other foreign representatives. Wilson, Lloyd George, Balfour Lansing had praised and encouraged the Chinese delegation. This incident was communicated to China. English and Chinese newspapers, the Yi Shih Pao, reported eagerly.

the Obata Incident had happened; Obata, the Japanese Minister to Peking, threatened the Peking government to restrict the behaviour of the Chinese delegation. Tokuji Kasahara had researched Chinese newspapers and concluded that the communication of the Japanese Minister's bluff contributed to provoke and spread the anti-Japanese movement absolutely.⁴² This news was supplied from English papers.

Yu Ku-min (餘穀民) of Shen-chou Jih-pao (神州日報) paper told Hata (波多) that since yesterday (5, Feb.) Carl Crow, who is America's Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information, eagerly circulated demagogic anti-Japanese opinion through Chinese papers using the Minister Obata's request to the Chinese Foreign Minister.⁴³

We can guess that not only Crow but also Reinsch took some role in this campaign, because Reinsch visited the Foreign Minister's office just some minutes after Obata's bluff.⁴⁴ We already know his disclosure tactic against Japan, he once advised Powell and Hollington K. Tong to disclose.⁴⁵

This Obata Incident was widely known in China through the Yi Shih Pao (益世報) newspaper. The incident happened on Feb 2nd, the date was one of the holidays celebrating Chinese traditional new year. All of the other Chinese newspapers were in usual recess for the celebration, the Yi Shih Pao issued a special edition for the incident.⁴⁶ The Yi Shih Pao, one of the major newspapers, was

42 Kasahara's article.

43 The Document of Japan Foreign Ministry, 2, 3, 2, 2, 1-2 "Paris Peace Treaty: Attitude and Situation of Other Powers, China 3", pp. 695-6. 外務省記録2, 3, 1, 1-20 《巴里平和條約・列國ノ態度及ビ政況・支那三》, pp. 695-696.

神州日報ノ餘穀民ガ波多ニ傳フル所ニ依レバ米國側ノ通信機關東方新聞社ノ「カル・クロウ」ハ昨日「二月五日」來所謂小幡公使ノ外交次長ヘノ要求問題ナルモノニ付盛ニ漢字新聞其他ニ運動シテ排日の論調ニ出デシメン事ニ努メ……

44 The Shantung Problem. No. 150.

45 A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*. P. 185. (FEPUS.)

46 Kasahara's article.

purchased by an American syndicate after the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement, so they became an American funded newspaper. The Yi Shih Pao was published at Tian-jin and Peking. During the May Fourth Movement the Yi Shi Pao supported the students' opinion, and was known to have a pro-America and anti-Japanese opinion. Reinsch details the purchase of the Yi Shih Pao as follows:

During the height of the student movement in 1919 the Peking police closed the offices of the Yi Shih Pao (Social Welfare [益世報]), a liberal paper in Peking. The paper had made itself disliked by publishing news of the Japanese negotiations and criticizing the militarist faction. A number of Americans had previously interested themselves in the paper, because of its liberal tendencies and because of its devotion to social welfare work; they proposed to take it over, but the transfer had not yet been carried out. The Chinese editor of the paper appealed to me to assist him in the liberation of an associate who had been imprisoned. As no legal American interest at the time existed in the paper, however, it was not possible to use my good offices in its behalf, although I had at all times made the Chinese officials know that the suppression of free speech in the press was a very undesirable procedure. The suppression of the Yi Shih Pao was a result of the desire of the reactionary faction in Peking to choke every expression favourable to the national movement they had been encourage to imitate the stringent press regulations of Japan.....Later on the American completed their purchase of the Yi Shih Pao. The question as to how far American protection should be extended over newspapers printed in Chinese, but owned by Americans, then came up for decision. As Americans had become interested in the bona fied enterprise of publishing newspapers in Chinese, it was not apparent how such protection as is given to others for their legitimate interests could be refused in this case. I therefore recommended to the Department of State that no distinction be made against such enterprises, and several vernacular papers were subsequently registered in American consulates.

When I told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that American registry had been given the Yi Shih Pao, I informed him of the character of the American press laws, under

which newspapers are in normal times entirely free from censorship, but are responsible in law for any misstatements of fact injurious to individuals. Many of the reactionary officials had persistently opposed the idea of having American registered vernacular papers in China. But, manifestly, they could not make any valid protest against such an arrangement. In fact, we never had any expression of official displeasure; on the contrary, nothing could have been more welcome to the people of China and to the great majority of officials than to know that vernacular papers were to be published in China by Americans.⁴⁷

Thus Reinsch justified the purchase. But we should not deny the fact that America possessed another propaganda device, namely newspaper. Though the purchase of the Yi Shih Pao of T'ien-chin was completed in May,⁴⁸ the Yi Shih Pao of Peking had some difficulties and was completed in August.⁴⁹ Some of the other papers also changed their nationalities.⁵⁰

Chapter Four: A Short Survey: The May Fourth Movement on *Millard's Review*

Regarding Wilson's Fourteen Points, Dr. Suguru Yokoyama once taught me that Wilson enjoyed general popularity in China before and during the session of the conference and showed his suspicion that the contemporary Chinese people and American residents in China had not tried to realize the correct meaning of the principle, the Fourteen Points. Of course, the word "self-determination" was so brilliant, but originally the Fourteen Points referred to the concrete names of Europe and its rims, not to the Far Eastern ones. Dr. Yokoyama also concluded that Wilson

47 AADC. pp. 157-8.

48 PRFR. 1919. p. 389.

49 PRFR. 1919. p. 389.

50 PRFR. 1919. pp. 389-90.

did not think of the Far Eastern issues seriously.

So, then, let's see the articles in Millard's Review. The link between the self-determination and the Shantung problem can be seen as soon as January of 1918, the same month of the proclamation of the Fourteen Points. The first reference was made by J. B. Powell in Editorial Paragraphs, but it was merely a simple introduction. There was also Paul Hutchinson's article "China and the Coming peace" that dealt with the Fourteen Points.⁵¹ However his link was not so sensational or rigid. He examined the principles and tried to find out how to adapt them to China's case; for example, he explored the basic thought behind the words and tried to substitute the noun "Russia" with "China," concluding that it "is improbable that China, in that Conference, cannot evolve some program." There was no reference to the name of Shantung or Kiaochow.

On April, Hollington K. Tong's article proceeded further.⁵² Hollington K. Tong was J. B. Powell's protege at the school of journalism of Missouri University, a powerful writer and the assistant editor of the Millard's Review at that time in Peking. Through an interview with Mr. Carlson C. Chang, China's requests emerged more fully. The adoption of the principle by China became more concrete, referring to Shantung. In August, Tong warned of Japanese invasion by The Attempt to Make China A Japanese Colony.⁵³

Coming close to the end of the war, articles concerning President Wilson's addresses and statements appeared frequently. The consistency of articles might rightly be the basic facts of references in the diplomatic papers of the United States and Japan. Those articles were for example; President Wilson's Labor Day

51 MR. Jan. 19, 1918.

52 MR. Apr. 27, 1918 China's Conditions at the Peace Conference.

53 MR. Aug. 24, 1918.

Address⁵⁴, President Wilson Announce Allied Peace Principles Anew⁵⁵, President Wilson's Answers to Germany⁵⁶, President Wilson Replies to Germany and Austria-Hungary⁵⁷, What Can President Wilson Do for China?⁵⁸, China Must Receive Full Justice at the Peace Conference!⁵⁹, President Wilson and the League for Peace⁶⁰. What President Wilson Mean by "Freedom of the Sea"⁶¹ We could categorize these articles into three sections. First, articles introducing Wilson's addresses and diplomatic documents, with no concrete referring to East Asian affairs. These were, in a sense, merely quotations. Secondly, justifying and protecting the American standpoint in China and these were apparently written by the Guardian of China. Reinsch, Crow and Powell had acted like that. Finally, articles based on the Chinese standpoint, speaking out clearly what Chinese people wanted, Shantung and so on. Hollington K. Tong represented this standpoint.

In 1919, the Paris Conference began.

It seems that the evil image of Japan had been much enhanced by the "Obata Incident" and the reports of the Korean Independence movement. February saw the infamous "Obata Incident." Besides circulation of the news⁶², the staff of the Review directly inquired of Obata what he had asked the Peking government, gathering together representatives of Associated Press, Reuter's, North China Daily News, China Press, North China Star, The (London) Times.⁶³ And in March the

54 MR. Sep. 7, 1918.

55 MR. Oct. 5, 1918.

56 MR. Oct. 19, 1918.

57 MR. Oct. 26, 1918.

58 MR. Nov. 16, 1918.

59 MR. Nov. 16, 1918.

60 MR. Dec. 21, 1918.

61 MR. Dec. 28, 1918.

62 MR. Feb. 8, 1919 Editorial Paragraphs.

63 MR. Feb. 8, 1919 Editorial Paragraphs.

Korean March First Independence Movement had begun. With great interest, Millard's Review communicated news regarding this movement with sympathy, but pessimistically.⁶⁴ Carl Crow and J. B. Powell regarded Japan's control over and colonization of Korea as the proceeding invasion model of Japan's control over China.⁶⁵

With the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement, Powell regretted the "violation" of the students and showed sympathy in the desperate atmosphere. He seemed unable to find out "positive" significance at the time, and he still defended the position of America and President Wilson.⁶⁶ It was "Correspondent" letters rather than professional articles that guided us to the real feeling and atmosphere of the students.⁶⁷

And in June the Chinese delegation refused to sign the Peace treaty. Hollington K. Tong wrote about "Significance of China Refusal to Sign the Peace Treaty" and revealed the insignificance of the signature.⁶⁸ In the end he quoted the dispatch from the delegate, dated June 27.

64 MR. Mar. 15, 22, 1919 Editorial Paragraphs. The most sensational paragraph was seen at pp. 78-9, detailed the number of the arrested and the victims.

65 ISC. p. 7.

66 MR. May. 10, Editorial Paragraphs.

.....It is to be regretted that violent means were used in driving these men from office, for such action tends to make the world even more skeptical of China's ability to rule herself.

But he did not deny the outbreak totally. He concluded:

.....The outlook is indeed dark for China, but if out of this calamity a new Chinese consciousness is born as seems indicated by the present action of the students, then there is hope.

67 MR. May 17, Correspondent "To ignore China's Claim to Kiaochow is Dangerous"

.....spontaneous outburst of popular feeling against pro-Japanese officials who are charged with selling their national birthright to Japan.....The demonstration was originally held as a protest against the reported decision.....To ignore their claim is dangerous, especially in view of the fact that all along they have patiently waiting for such a decision [the return of Shantung] from the Paris conference and that any other decision would so disappoint them that they may be capable of doing anything, conscious of their being treated by the Powers with injustice.

68 MR. July 12.

.....After careful consideration, we decided to refrain from attending the meeting and signing the peace treaty.....This, we hope, will leave some room for further steps to be taken us in the future.

And the unsolved problem of China problem became his main thesis at Washington in 1921 and 1922.

Chapter Five: The May Fourth Movement and America

The Chinese expected much from the peace conference. Crow tells us the atmosphere, which soon turned into disappointment and rage.

As a result of all this propaganda the Chinese came to the conclusion that the peace which promised so much to Europe and the rest of the world meant a great deal to them also, that in some way they would be helped out of difficulties. They felt confident that after all President Wilson had said about self-determination and the rights of weak nations against powerful ones, the least the peace conference could do would be to disavow Japanese claims in Shantung and restore the territory which Germany had seized just a few years before the Boxer uprising. A great many Chinese who credited me with a much more important official position than I occupied asked me about this and I did not hesitate to tell them that their hopes were quite justified. I think this expressed the opinion of the American legation.⁶⁹

Reinsch and Crow were serious about the solution of the Shantung problem. Neither of them were Machiavellian. But how about W. Wilson? Wilson was famous for his missionary diplomacy. However his diplomacy actually depended upon forces, especially in the diplomacy dealing with Latin America countries.⁷⁰ American propaganda activities led by Reinsch and Crow were originally located in the parts of such Machiavellian diplomacy. However, they seemed to go beyond

⁶⁹ ISC. p. 28.

⁷⁰ Robert Dallek. *The American Style of Foreign Policy*, 1983.

American diplomacy, and were both disappointed at the news of Wilson's compromise with the Japanese. Wilson made a compromise on behalf of the establishment of the League of Nations. Reinsch showed his sympathy to the May Fourth Movement:

No one could fail to sympathize with the aims and ideals of the students, who were striving for national freedom and regeneration. I, too, felt a strong sympathy, though I, of course, abstained from all direct contact with the movement, as it was a purely Chinese matter. Nevertheless, the Japanese papers reported quite in detail how I had organized the student movement, and how I had spent \$2,000,000 in getting it under way.⁷¹

Thus Reinsch showed his sympathy. It was natural for him to sympathize with the students, because he had been resisting Japanese invasion policy since the Twenty-one Demands. But it is curious that he, himself, denied the "direct" contact with the movement. It is doubtful. J. B. Powell wrote that Reinsch was "indirectly" responsible for the creation of the Chinese Student Movement.⁷² The results of the May Fourth Movement were the release of arrested students (8th July), dismissal of pro-Japan mandarin, refusal to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty on July 28th and so on.⁷³ Concerning the arrested students, Reinsch wrote that he had telephoned and inquired into the safety of the students.⁷⁴ An American syndicate purchased the Yi Shih Pao. According to these circumstances, we could imagine, Reinsch had played an important role in provoking and nourishing the movement.

What Reinsch had done was rightly appreciated by the Chinese. For example the students' slogans were like "Ten-thousand-years celebration on Great America! Ten-thousand-years celebration on Wilson!" Recently studies have clarified that the

⁷¹ AADC. p. 376. ⁷² MTC. p. 46.

⁷² MTC. p. 376

⁷³ Saitou summed up the major points of the student's slogan: the return of the Shantung, awaking the Chinese people in the national crisis, sanctions on betrayals 齊藤前揭書, pp. 44-8.

⁷⁴ AADC. p. 376

Chinese people possessed an empty illusion that America was going to save China from many problems.⁷⁵

The May Fourth Movement had spread to the whole country, Shanghai was known for famous triple strikes of students, laborers and merchants. A Japanese consul general reported that the "Chinese national congress" gathered 30,000 people. And he also reported the decision that Chinese people never accepted the Peace Treaty and showed their gratitude toward America for what they had done.⁷⁶

Reinsch resigned in August and left China in September. Various classes of the Chinese people mourned his departure and praised his activities for what he had done for China. So, in spite of betrayal of Wilson, the Chinese showed gratitude toward America. The range of the gratitude stretched wide, from the Peking government officers, to guild houses, to bankers, to merchants, to students. Thus the Chinese showed gratitude. Ironically and inevitably, the strictest accusation to Wilson was made by Reinsch. At the Twenty-One Demands Reinsch had made a vigorous and effective protest, and his sympathy with China and the Chinese people was well known. Some people said that Reinsch acted not for America but for China.⁷⁷ At the height of their activities Reinsch joined the student movement.⁷⁸ Reinsch and Crow were disappointed by the compromise made by Wilson. Reinsch explained the reason why he was going to resign.

In making this communication to you I cannot but refer to recent developments with respect to China. The general outlook is indeed most discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here at present or until the home are willing to face the

75 齋藤前揭書, p. 107.

76 the Shantung Problem. No. 300.

77 *FEPUS*. p. 190. Chihiro Hosoya, "Twenty One Demands and America's response", 『『二一條要求』とアメリカの對應』(Hitotsubashi Ronsou, vol. 43 No. 1) examine the Reinsch's behaviour, and America's response.

78 "Preparation for the Peace Conference" 511. Kasahara's article.

situation and to act. It is not difficulties that deter me, and I should stay at my post if it were necessary and if I did not think that I could be of more use in the United States than China at the present time. But in fact, the situation requires that the American people should be made to realize what is at stake here for us in order that they may give the necessary backing to the Government for supporting any action which the developments here may require. Unless the American people realize this and the Government feels strong enough to take adequate action, the fruits of one hundred and forty years of American work in China will inevitably be lost.....During my service here I have constantly suffered from this lack of continuous attention at home to the Far Eastern situation.⁷⁹

We can understand the reason why Reinsch resigned. He resigned because he had to go home and let American people know the situation in China. And Reinsch knew that he was temporarily defeated by the Japanese.

My resignation was accepted in a cablegram received on the 18 of August, the President expressing formally his regrets that I should find it necessary to insist upon relinquishing my post. Even now, when I knew how decidedly the President had misjudged the Chinese situation, notwithstanding my insistent and detailed warnings, I had no desire to advertise difference in policy. The Japanese press, I knew, would consider my resignation was due to the defeat of my "policy" to have American maintain her honorable and trusted position in China. I did not wish to favor this sort of interpretation by a controversy with the administration.⁸⁰

Reinsch and Crow had provoked the May Fourth Movement, but they were defeated by Japan which had forced Wilson to compromise at Versailles. After his resignation, Reinsch privately acted as an adviser to the Peking Government. He also promoted various American enterprises to invest in China, and died in Shanghai.⁸¹

79 *AADC*. pp. 364-6.

80 *AADC*. p. 382.

81 *MTC*. pp. 49-50.

Carl Crow stayed in China after World War I, managed advertising agencies, issued several magazines, and as a genius of writing he wrote and warned of Japanese invasion.⁸² His description was the inspiration of this thesis, he also hailed the separated negotiations with Germany as a “really important diplomatic victory.”⁸³ It is very curious that Crow's anti-Japanese -invasion books were written after the year of 1937.

How about America? Was there any influence from the unsolved Chinese problem? In the United States, Republican Harding was elected as next President. J. B. Powell had met Harding during his presidential election campaign in 1920. Powell wrote about the episode in which Harding could not tell China from India.⁸⁴ But the victory of Harding was largely owed to the Shantung problem “more than any single issue.” So new President had to call the conference in 1921, the very year he arrived at the post.⁸⁵ Crow also wrote:

The [Washington] conference set up machinery for the discussion of all pending Chinese problems. In fact China secured at this conference almost all she had hoped to get at Versailles.⁸⁶

Concerning the return of Shantung, Crow's evaluation was correct. But Powell regarded the Washington Conference as a failure, because “Republican

82 *ISC. JAPAN'S DREAM OF WORLD EMPIRE; TANAKA MEMORIAL. 1942.* also details the invasion policy of Japan, based on the “fake” memorial of Giichi Tanaka.

83 *CTHP*. -xii-

.....The Chinese delegates refused to sign the peace treaty but made a separated treaty with Germany in which the latter's extraterritorial rights were canceled. This was really the first breach in the wall of foreign special rights, but the Chinese were so chagrined over the failure to oust Japan from Shantung that little attention was paid to this really important diplomatic victory. Crow also depicted the lives of the German and the Russian who lost the extraterritoriality in *Foreign Devils in the Flowery Kingdom*, pp. 122-5.

84 *MTC*. pp. 62-3.

85 *MTC*. pp. 71-4. The Wellington Koo Memoir D. 1 The aftermath of the Peace Treaty.

86 *CTHP*. -xiii-

Administration lacked sincerity” and the “Japs were quick to take advantage” again.⁸⁷

CONCLUSION

Not any one factor could have launched the May Fourth Movement singly. I do believe there were many factors which made it possible for the Chinese to accomplish such a gigantic democratic movement: awaking of the intellectuals, students, merchants, laborers; grown up industries; the influence of illusory proletariat paradise in revolutionary Russia and so on. We have examined the influence of American propaganda. It was merely a trigger in the whole mechanism.

But even such a trigger had been underestimated, or neglected. We should not deny American Propaganda activities. American propaganda had influenced the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement.

Apart from Wilson's intention, there already existed a crusader at Peking; Minster Reinsch had acted for the Chinese government before America's declaration of war against Germany. This was one of the reason why the Chinese expected “high hope,” as Crow described, for the Versailles Peace Conference or Wilson's Fourteen Points. With America's entrance to the war, Crow began his propaganda. Carl Crow has been almost forgotten. But his several lines of his book thus reveals the forgotten historical aspect of the May Fourth Movement. It is also essential to seek out the principle or the human relationship among the graduates from the School of Journalism of Missouri University. For example Hollington K. Tong, a graduate of the school, was an vigorous advocator before and during the peace conference. And he wrote that the China Press was “a paper to which a procession

87 *MTC*. p. 81.

of promising young American and Chinese writers had come, and on whose staff many of them received their first journalistic training.” Millard's Review of the Far East changed its name several times and was finally named China Weekly Review in 1923. In 1928 a young American arrived at Shanghai. He had a letter of recommendation written by Walter Williams, the Dean and the founder of the School of Journalism of Missouri University. He got his job at China Weekly Review and soon became an assistant editor. His name was Edgar Snow.

第二場(A) 時間 / 四月二十四日 14:00~15:40

主持人 / 朱重聖
國史館副館長

主講人	論文題目	主評人
張玉法	山東人民對巴黎和會中有關山東問題的反應	盧培琪
熊月之	五四運動與上海社會	陳三井
王 柯	「祖國」的發展與民族、宗教、傳統文化的再認識 ——中國穆斯林的五四與新文化運動	張中復